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REVERSIBILITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY I N
MERLEAU-PONTY'S ONTOLOGY
BEATA STAWARSKA
In this essay I wish to examine critically Merleau-Ponty's treatment of
relations with others in the light of his ontology of the flesh. I shall argue
that the uniform character of the flesh and of its dynamic principle ,
reversibility leads to a reduction of the inter-subjective experience of the
body manifest in an encounter with another embodied person, to a form of
reflexivity operative within the body proper (le corps propre) . The
mechanics of the process by means of which the reduction is effectuated ar e
the following : a specific, intra-subjective experience of the body is taken as a
paradigm for relations to other embodied subjects . Simultaneously, its
peculiar character is effaced for the sake of producing a single explanator y
theory of the flesh . Deprived of its concrete specificity, the experience of
one's own body comes to provide the standard norm for intersubjective o r
intercorporeal relations . These appear as a mere variant of the general
schema, a "special case" contained in the universal dynamic of the flesh an d
subsumed under the heading of bodily reversibility . As a result, the
peculiarities of intersubjective as well as intrasubjective lived experiences o f
the body are bracketed and a single category of reflexivity is applied to auto-
and hetero-relations alike .
1
Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy reads as an ongoing, unfinished project ,
not only due to the author's premature death but also to the inexhaustibility
of the subject, commentary on what he came to term the flesh . The flesh get s
defined in the course of his fine descriptions included in The Visible and the
Invisible as a prototype of Being, the original and ultimate component of al l
there is .' It is therefore an ontological notion and not e . g . an anthropological
concept on which to found a "Philosophy of Man ." Indeed, the anonymous
and a-personal character attributed to the flesh is said to have opened u p
Merleau-Ponty's inquiry beyond the predominant perspective of the corps
propre from the Phenomenology of Perception, where the starting point for
analysis is situated within the body of the subject, as different from that o f
objectivities . This "anthropocentric" perspective is argued by numerou s
commentators to have been weighed down by a subjectivistic or idealisti c
heritage and ultimately incapable of transcending traditional binarisms, such
as subject-object and intelligibility-sensibility? The ontological perspectiv e
of the final work, wherein the body proper no longer provides the matrix but
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is turned into an "exemplar" of general Sensibility and an instance of th e
anonymous movement of Reversibility running in multiple vectors
throughout the flesh is said, on the other hand, to have successfully resolve d
the tension between these unfounded dualisms haunting the Western
philosophical tradition . Following that interpretation, The Visible and the
Invisible introduces a radical turn into the trajectory of Merleau-Ponty' s
thinking and distances his early phenomenology of the body-subject from the
later ontology of the flesh .
This interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's oeuvre calls for some clarification .
First of all, Merleau-Ponty himself was well aware of the constraint s
imposed upon his early project by the terminology adopted notably from th e
idealist phenomenology of Husserl . 3 Secondly, the shift from the incarnate d
subject to the aesthesiological body, i .e. the body defined primarily in term s
of anonymous reversibility and not as a privileged vantage point ont o
"objects" of perception, was announced already prior to its explici t
formulation in The Visible and the Invisible . Albeit still operating with the
concept of the (tacit) cogito, Merleau-Ponty underlined also the anonymou s
character of sensible experience, long before the reversibility thesis has bee n
made .' Finally, the explicit ontological claims made in the final late work ar e
in a continuum with the earlier statements on the study of phenomena . The
thesis of the primacy of perception contains, albeit it does not explicate, a
notion of an originary unity of Being and so reads as a constructive attemp t
towards establishing a phenomenological ontology : the field of perceptio n
co-involves that which is revealed (perceptual reality) and the one to who m
it is revealed (perceiver) and so ontological primacy belongs neither t o
"subjectivity" nor to "objectivity" but to the unitary phenomenal world ,
theorised ultimately under the heading of the flesh . '
This being said, the explicitly ontological treatment of sensible life i n
terms of impersonal structures occurs only in Merleau-Ponty's final work .
This deliberately ontological perspective has direct implications for th e
question of intersubjectivity . The anonymous structure of sensibility o f
which my and other bodies are exemplars naturally resolves the "problem of
the Other" haunting the perspective of transcendental constitution in
phenomenology: the existence of alter egos ceases to be a contradiction as
soon as the starting point of ego cogito is abandoned for the sake of a mor e
originary dynamic of reversibility manifest in the lives of sensible/sentien t
beings . 6 A problem to be resolved in turn within this radically impersona l
perspective, however, might be of how to theorise persons or account for
non-identical subjectivities copartaking in the dynamic of the flesh without
disappearing in it . Phrased differently, a new dilemma faced by the ontology
of the flesh could be that of a plurality of independent selves, without which
it would make little sense to speak of relations between I and other . If we
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posit an originary stage of non-differentiation I-other, we cannot eve n
formulate the question of intersubjectivity . Hence it has been observed that
Merleau-Ponty's model "rather than solving the problem of intersubjectivity ,
threatens to dissolve it by annulling every plurality .
These lines voice a concern that, if reversibility is to explain - as it does
-
how different embodied selves communicate, it should explain also ho w
different selves arise or how the germ of self-other differentiation is containe d
already in pre-reflective anonymity . I contend, however, that if there is a
difficulty inherent in the "intersubjective relations" model from the ontolog y
of the flesh, it lies more specifically in its being derived from a subjectiv e
perspective and being indebted to the vecu of the body proper . The difficulty
would be found less in Merleau-Ponty's procedure of "annulling" a diversit y
of bodily subjects and "dissolving" the problem of intersubjectivity than in hi s
constructing the extra-subjective relation on the basis of the subjective body
dynamic and locating the intelligibility of inter-corporeal life within an intra-
corporeal experience . In view of substantiating this thesis, I begin by citin g
some of Merleau-Ponty's examples of reversibility manifest within as well a s
between bodies . Consider first the often-cited case of the body proper relatin g
or returning to itself, as in the example of touching the hand which palpates
environing objects with the other hand (VI, 176; 133) . When my right hand
comes into contact with the left hand palpating something, its activity easil y
reverses into the passivity of an organ being touched by the other hand . At the
crossroads of touching and of being touched, my sensible body manifest s
itself both as a tactile "agent" and a "patient," distributing active and passiv e
roles among different bodily parts .
The same compresence of tactile activity and passivity is unveiled in a
body-to-body encounter with another person, e .g . in shaking hands . When
my bodily organ touches an organ belonging to the body of another person ,
or more specifically, when the other returns my handshake, my shaking han d
is being shaken as well and the activity of touching is present together wit h
the passivity of being touched. It follows that the handshake exhibits the
same kind of reversibility that is manifest within the sensible dynamics o f
my own body, and that the latter provides a ready model for the former . "La
main d'autrui que je serre est a comprendre sur le modele de la main
touchante et touchee . "8 "The handshake too is reversible, I can feel mysel f
touched as well and at the same time as touching ." (VI, 187 ; 142) .
The handshake seems to extend the sentient sensibility of a carnal auto
-
relation onto a relation with another incarnated self . The other perso n
appears to turn the intra-corporeal reversibility of my right hand touching th e
left hand into an inter-corporeal exchange, playing out the reversal o f
touching and being touched between two bodies . In a direct reference t o
Husserl, 9 Merleau-Ponty notes that my body accomplishes "a sort o f
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reflection" when I touch myself touching . Now, when I shake the hand o f
another man, "his hand is substituted for my left hand" (PS, 168, emphasi s
added) . The hand of the other takes the place of the organ belonging to m y
body and leaves the nature of the reflexive relation unaffected . In a
handshake, my body merely "annexes the body of another person in that
"sort of reflection" it is paradoxically the seat of' (ibid .) . The paradox of
reflection applies therefore to contacts of skin surface within the limits of th e
body proper as well as to contacts with other tactile bodies . After all, the
touching-touched moment enacted between my two hands is said to provid e
the model for every reflection. "
Note that the natural divide between the body of the other and my own
does not prevent the "annexing" or functional in-corporation of foreig n
organs into my sensible system from taking place . For there is no need to
assume that there is "some huge animal whose organs our bodies would be "
(VI, 187; 142) in order to account for the reversal of touch across discret e
bodily beings . We need not be one body in order to be of one flesh ;
reversibility is a carnal auto-relation operative within the flesh as a whole ,
where my body and the body of the other "are like organs of one singl e
intercorporeality" (PS, 168) .
Focusing on the category of "one single intercorporeality," of which th e
body proper is an element but for which it does not provide a starting point of
analysis, Merleau-Ponty follows here the aforementioned line of renouncing
the anthropological or psychological perspective in favour of an ontological
one . My body and other bodies (whether celestial or of other persons, plants ,
vehicles) are viewed in terms of their belonging to the whole of Being o r
Flesh, governed by the principle of reflexivity . As stated in a working note ,
"the flesh is a mirror phenomenon" (VI, 309; 255) and the phenomenon of
reflecting, doubling, mirroring, is an ontological and not a psychologica l
category. At the same time, reflexivity or mirroring gets derived from th e
auto-relation at work in the body proper nevertheless : "the mirror is a n
extension of my relation with my body" (Ibid .) . One may wonder, however ,
whether the procedure of unqualified extending of the reversibility of a bod y
or the body proper onto the Flesh and its intercorporeality is valid an d
justified. Is not the dynamic of reversibility intrinsically confined to the limits
of the sensible organisation of the body proper? Does not the exercise o f
reversibility define the limits of the sensible/sentient body and draw th e
border between the body proper and alter bodies? A passage from Zahavi' s
reading of Husserl will help to develop that point ."
If we first examine the case of one hand touching the other [the hand of the other], th e
touching hand [ . . .] has a series of sensations which are objectified and interpreted as bein g
properties of the touched hand [ . . .] . When I touch my hand, however, the touched hand i s
not given as a mere object, since it feels the touch itself, and this sensing does not belong
to the touched hand as an objective property, but is localised in it as an Empftndnis . The
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decisive difference between touching one's own body and everything else, be it inanimat e
objects or the bodies of Others, is that it implies a double-sensation . The relation between
the touching and the touched is reversible, since the touching is touched, and the touche d
is touching . It is this reversibility that testifies that the interiority [the body felt fro m
inside] and the exteriority [the body surface] are different manifestations of the sam e
[body] . (p . 107) .
These remarks certify that the reversibility of tactile sensations applie s
exclusively to the sensible dynamic of a unique body and that it can b e
witnessed in the body proper only . The tactile sensation can be double i. e .
co-involve active (touching) and passive (touched) aspects within the sam e
living body only, since, negatively spoken, it does not suffice that th e
passivity be experienced as an "objective property" of the hand bein g
touched (i .e. the hand of the other) and which one does not feel within one' s
sensible body . In that case, the duplicity of tactile sensations would have t o
be read as a split between subjectivity and objectivity and not as an essentia l
interrelation of two distinguishable yet non-opposable sides of one sensibl e
phenomenon . Activity and passivity would be compresent yet the tactil e
sensation would not be double . For the same reasons, passivity cannot be a
mere effect of the activity exerted upon my body by the other with whom I
shake hands, even though in this case "I feel myself touched as well and a t
the same time as touching ." The compresence of the touching and touche d
moments alone does not guarantee that touch is experienced under its doubl e
or reversible character .
The sensation is double/reversible due to its anchoring in bodily organs o f
sense, from which the sensible movement originates (touching hand) and t o
which it can return (hand being touched) . It is through the localisation of the
bodily organ within the totality of the sensible body, gained through th e
feedback from the hand being touched (and missing in case of touching the
hand of somebody else where the touch does not localise the touched as th e
same (body) but as other), that the tactile sensation is experienced a s
double/reversible . Put more generally, senses are bound to organs, even
though they cannot be identified with them . Tactile duplicity is situate d
within the bodily organ-isation; it is localised in bodily organs of sense ,
themselves double or reflexive, sensible and sentient . The duplicity o f
activity/passivity is the attribute of a body and of its sensibility .
As localised in the (reflexive) body, sensations can be identified as mine .
The reflexivity of sensations means that the activity of sensing is referred
back to the organ and that the organ is aware of itself as it palpate s
something other . A hand, and generally a body, is aesthesiologically given
both under a genitive and a dative form, i . e . it can be given to itself in touch
and in sensibility. Double sensation is a form of self-awareness on the part o f
the sensing body, which guarantees that the sensing is experienced under th e
form of mineness and not as an anonymous event . Reversibility is both the
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principle of reflexivity of the senses and of self-reference of the individua l
sensing body .'Z Henceforth, it can be experienced and belongs to th e
sensibility of the body proper and does not extend in an automatic an d
unmodified fashion onto intercorporeality at large .
II
Let me now examine the structural character of a handshake in order t o
bring to light its difference from touching oneself, and further question
Merleau-Ponty's extension of the infra-bodily experience onto the domain o f
the inter-body . Recall that Merleau-Ponty states that when I shake hand s
with someone, their hand is simply "substituted" for my hand and that thei r
activity "substitutes" the activity of my touching hand . Yet there are valid
reasons for putting forward the contrary claim that the bodily relation I hol d
with myself is significantly different from the relation I hold with anothe r
embodied person .
Surely I can touch myself just as I can touch and be touched by the other .
Yet even though I can align my hands to make the sign of an "amen" or
appraise a performance by clapping my hands together, I cannot shake hands
with myself, no matter how I would twist and turn my arms . My left hand i s
a mirror image of the right one, just as, the left side of my visible bod y
mirrors the right side . Needless to say, the mirroring enacted between the
body sides is approximate ; seeing a photographic collage where one side of
my face merges with its exact mirror image can produce a bizarre effect an d
remind me that the natural symmetry is imperfect. Still, my body remains a
"mirror phenomenon" : it forms an open diptych where one volet is a more or
less accurate reflection of the other one ; the mirror facing my body provide s
a reflection of the entire bodily diptych . My body mirrors itself "before" it
has been faced with the instrument of the mirror; it is a seat of living
reflection independent of the reflection appearing on a smooth surface of a
speculum . Now, returning to the example of a handshake, that means tha t
shaking hands with myself is structurally as "impossible" as shaking hands
with my mirror image, assuming that the phantom I see in front of me could
turn to flesh and blood one day .
The phenomenon of mirroring taking place between the sides of my bod y
is certainly not identical to the mirroring of the body in the instrument of the
mirror. Even though my left hand is a "mirror image" of the right one, still -
unlike the phantom organ reflecting my right hand in the mirror - it is a n
organ with a reality of its own . My left hand is determined as being on the
left side of my body, the (reflection of my) right hand in the mirror remain s
determined as right . My right hand reflected in the mirror remains right even
though for the phantom that I see in front of me, the position of the hand
would have to be reversed . From the phantom's point of view - if there was
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to be one - the hand would be determined as (belonging to the) left (volet o f
the body) . Yet when I look at myself in the mirror, it is my bodily
perspective that determines what is right and what is left . If the idea of
shaking hands with the phantom does not even "cross my mind," it i s
because my bodily perspective is monopolistic in this case and I do not allow
for an independent bodily perspective for which bodily organs could b e
determined as left or right . The phantom does not have a right hand that I
could embrace with my right hand in a handshake . In an analogous way, my
right hand cannot embrace my other real hand in a handshake . For my left
hand, enlocked in the internal mirror of my body-diptych and subject to it s
specular logic of symmetrical parallelism is a living reflection but not a
living duplicate of the right hand . Only the other person can transcend thi s
internal bodily reflection, breaking the mirror of my body with their hand . It
follows that the other can not be "annexed" in the mirror play enacte d
already within the spectacle of my body ; or, to inverse the famous slogan ,
that l'homme n 'est pas miroir pour l'homme . t 3
I cannot, in the manner of the biblical Adam, make another embodie d
human grow out of a part of my body and so I cannot produce a handshake
from within my corporeal existence . For even though the organs of th e
"small animal" that I am can touch themselves, they cannot greet themselves .
To greet (shake hands, but also embrace or kiss) is to welcome anothe r
"animal", to send out my organ (hands, lips) towards them and to meet th e
organ sent out from their alter body . A handshake does more than merel y
enlarge the field of my auto-reflecting body : it involves an exchange acros s
two bodies that could not be realised independently in either of them, a ne w
event of inter-corporeal "reversal" of greeting and being greeted unknown t o
the intra-corporeal reversibility of a body touching itself.
III
Let me not create a false impression that touching oneself is a solitar y
event devoid of any intersubjective significance . On the contrary, it reveals
to me my body as a tactile thing given both to my activity and to the activity
of the other . The tactile body that I am is a public thing, taking me right from
the start into the realm of public relations, i . e . relations with other touching
and tactile subjects . Yet insofar as I am the public body that the other ca n
touch, I remain, as Merleau-Ponty put it, always "on the same side of m y
body" (VI, 194 ; 148) . I remain on the same side of the hand that greets the
other but cannot greet itself for it cannot go to "the other side" of the body ,
the side of the body of the other with whom I shake hands . It is this
inalterable situation in the body of mine that prevents the reversibility I
experience when my compresent hands touch themselves from fusing wit h
the reversibility I live when I touch and am touched by another person . It is
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the unique vantage point of my body that prevents me from adopting th e
vantage point of the other and grasping the passivity of my hand bein g
touched as the activity of the other touching hand . What distinguishes the
intercorporeal relation from the intracorporeal one is that the passivity of m y
hand touched by the other - unlike the passivity of my hand that I touch -
cannot reverse into an activity (of touching) for me, even though I can
respond to the other touching me by touching them in turn . The break
between my body (the body proper) and the body of the other separates tw o
irreducible forms of bodily experience and makes it impossible to theoris e
reversibility as a uniform category applicable to the flesh as a whole .
Still, for Merleau-Ponty, the reversibility of the flesh is one, whether
considered in the midst of the bodily being that I am or in my relations to an
embodied other . Merleau-Ponty exemplifies the category of reversibility
with a case of a return to the self, such as touching the body which palpate s
something. This specific example might have led him to theorise reversibility
in terms of a deflection or reflection of activity exerted upon the world bac k
onto the body, and to subsume the activity of the other person exerted upo n
me under this pre-existent auto-reflective relation . Whether I act on my own
body (touching the palpitating hand) or whether it is the other person that
acts upon me (handshake), in both cases the passivity of being touche d
stands for the obverse or the reverse of the activity of touching (of my other
hand or the hand of the other) . The reversibility of the senses, e . g . touch, can
be argued therefore to implicate a unique sensible "movement" runnin g
through the body and the flesh . 14 Passivity of the body sentient equal s
sensible activity "moving in the opposite direction" ; henceforth, passivity
can always be reversed into activity, even if its source were other than my
(reversible) body . Reversibility between activity and passivity can therefor e
be applied to inter-personal relations and to auto-relations alike .
Yet the identification of bodily auto-relations and relations betwee n
bodies both runs the risk of forgetting that I am situated in a concrete body
which constitutes my unique point of view and is reductive of the alterity o f
another person, whose point of view is by definition cut off from me . The
uniform notion of reversibility is based on the presupposition that passivit y
is by definition the reverse of activity whether or not the reversal ca n
actually take place . We witness here an imperceptible shift from th e
phenomenologically valid account of reversibility in intra-corporeal life to
the metaphysical principle stipulating that a reversal between activity and
passivity must de jure be possible . The resulting general category o f
sensible reversible movement rejoins a scholastic principle of identit y
between actions and passions, espoused by e .g. Descartes . According to thi s
principle, actions and passions are ultimately one, in that their movemen t
involves a unique trajectory to be traversed from the side of the motor to the
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mobile or in the inverse or reverse direction . Depending on whether the
viewpoint of the motor or the mobile is adopted, the same movement
appears as active or passive . 1 5
Note that this definition of actions and passions adopts the point of view
of an impersonal (or anonymous) spectator, not situated in a unique and
unchanging bodily perspective but able to move freely between the two pole s
of the movement . This detached spectator could regard e .g . a handshake both
from the side of the person with whom I shake hands and from my side, and
thus would, hypothetically at least, be able to view the passivity of my hand
being touched by the other as an activity of touching for the other . This
detached spectator could subsume the unique movement of sentien t
sensibility operative in a body-to-body encounter with another person unde r
the phenomenon of touching one's own body, and declare that th e
reversibility of activity and passivity at work in inter-corporeal life i s
indistinguishable from the reversibility of active and passive roles played b y
one body sensing itself.
This impersonal spectator could therefore arrive at the thesis of unifor m
reversibility of the flesh that Merleau-Ponty upheld . It seems, however, that
the uniform character of this thesis is its drawback rather than its advantage
in that it conflates a variety of non-identical phenomena for the sake o f
producing a single explanatory theory of carnal life . We witness here a
collapse into the universal of both subjective and intersubjective body-to-
body situations, wherein the particularity of each is bracketed but for whic h
it is the lived experience of the body proper in the tactile reversibility of
double-sensations and in the reflexivity of specular symmetrism tha n
continues to provide the norm . At the same time, the normative character o f
the body proper gets obscured within the context of fleshly anonymity : the
principle of reversibility/reflexivity survives but it gets dislodged from it s
locus naturalis and ceases to apply to the subjective body experience only .
I conclude therefore that the argument for anonymous reversibilit y
operative within the flesh and described in the Visible and the Invisible i s
inspired primarily - and for good reasons! - by the first person live d
experience of the body and that - even though prevalent interpretation s
suggest the contrary - it remains indebted - again, for good reasons - to th e
"anthropological" perspective espoused in the Phenomenology of Perception .
Rather than annulling subjectivity (and intersubjectivity), it takes the form o f
a generalisation and universalisation of the specific relation the body prope r
holds with itself and it models the account of intersubjective relations on thi s
intra-bodily dynamic . Nevertheless, as I have argued in this essay, bodily
reflexivity can apply solely to a specific subjective experience and the "logi c
of the mirror" cannot govern intra- and inter-corporeal relations at once . The
task at hand is naturally to investigate the inter-corporeal experience of the
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1body in its particularity . The author would turn to Sartre's account of th e
experience of the body under the gaze of the other person from Being and
Nothingness for that purpose . 16 The experience of the body before the other i s
argued there to be irreducible to the experience of the body for the self ,
offering us a clue towards establishing the distinction between intra- and
inter-subjective dimensions of embodied experience .
Turning to Sartre for illumination on Merleau-Ponty's treatment o f
intersubjectivity, however, would require also reckoning with the vali d
criticisms the latter addressed against the dialectic system elaborated by the
former and raising the question of whether the terminology of the fles h
could ever be reconciled with the dualistic categories of Sartre' s
ontology ." After all, is not Merleau-Ponty's final work a culminating poin t
of his concerted effort towards overcoming the exclusive dualism o f
immanence and transcendence? Did he not criticise in his early texts this
dualistic reality model which provides a common battle-ground for the
debate between intellectualism and empiricism, where the immanent life o f
the subject is accorded ontological priority by the intellectualist camp ,
whereas the transcendent reality is granted ontological priority by th e
empiricists? Did he not demonstrate that a similar bifurcated reality mode l
orients Sartre's ontology of being and nothingness? Merleau-Ponty's lat e
ontology arose as an alternative to this "bad ontology ." It should be noted ,
however, that Sartre's turn away from pure phenomenology to ontology
was motivated by a similar contention that neither transcendence no r
immanence should have ontological priority . Hence Sartre's move beyond
the sphere demarcated by the immanental life of consciousness t o
encompass what is radically transcendent to it (the inert, opaque, resistan t
being or en-soi) .' 8 Surely, that does not lead to overcoming the polarise d
reality model and resolving the tension between immanence an d
transcendence : Sartre dialectically rejoins the two poles of the opposition
without questioning the foundations of the dualism. Despite the intention
to arrive at a unitary ontology, his thinking fails therefore to account fo r
the original unity of being - this is evident, for example, in the ontologica l
disjunction Sartre introduces between the subjective/private an d
objective/public facets of the body . 19 This split between the body-for-self
and the body-for-others can appear incongruous with Sartre's claim tha t
the other plays a constitutive role in the embodied existence of the self 2° I
contend, however, that if Sartre overstates the case of the disjunctio n
between the body-for others and the body-for-self, it is in view of securin g
the irreducibility of the intersubjective experience of the body occasione d
by the encounter with another person to the subjective one and not
exclusively as a result of his pervasive ontological dualism . His analysis
can therefore, despite the aforementioned difficulties, provide ground fo r
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theorising subjectivity and inter-subjectivity as compresent yet distinc t
modes of bodily life and act in favour of a renewed debate between Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty .
University of Louvai n
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Translated by R . C. McCleary . Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1964, p . 168 .
Hereafter PS . PS, 166 .
10. "Toute reflexion est du modele de celle de la main touchante par la main touchee ." (VI ,
257; 204) .
11. From the chapter on "The Lived Body" in Self-awareness and Alterity (Op . Cit .) .
12. For that reason Donn Welton uses reflexivity to rethink and em-body self-awareness . In
e.g . the article "Touching Hands" (forthcoming) .
13. Merleau-Ponty stipulates that "l'homme est miroir pour 1'homme" ("man is a mirror for
man") . L'Oeil et l'esprit . Paris: Gallimard, 1964, p. 34 . Thus the "mirror" relation applie s
simultaneously to the dynamics of the flesh, to intercorporeality and to the body proper .
14. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body sensible and the body sentient as "two segments of on e
singular course [ . . .], one sole movement in its two phases ." (VI, 182 ; 138, emphasi s
added) .
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15. In R. Descartes .The Passions of the Soul . Translated by S . Voss . Indianapolis : Hackett
Publishing Company, 1989, §1 . It is also present in Saint Thomas and Suarez (see E .
Gilson, Index scolastico-cartesien . Paris : 1913) .
16. L'Etre et le Want, (Paris : Gallimard, 1943) ; Being and Nothingness . An Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology . Translated by H . E . Barnes . New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956 . Henceforth EN . Especially "The Look" (292-341 ; 252-302) and "The
Body" (342-400; 303-359) .
17. Merleau-Ponty's in-depth criticism of Sartre's ontological dualism is developed in th e
"Interrogation and Dialectic" chapter of The Visible and the Invisible (75-141 ; 50-104) .
18. Sartre explains in detail his motivation for renouncing the perspective of transcendenta l
constitution in favour of a phenomenological ontology in the "Introduction" to Being and
Nothingness, entitled "The Pursuit of Being" (11-34 ; XLV-LXVII) .
19. The subjective and objective planes of bodily existence are said to be "radically distinct "
and exist "on two incommunicable levels" (EN, 343; 304). (Sartre distinguishes in fac t
between three ontological dimensions of the body ; still, the distinction into thre e
dimensions - a point that cannot be developed here in detail - hangs on the basic dualis m
of the body-subject and the body-object) .
20. A criticism to that effect can be found in e . g . M. C. Dillon's "Sartre on the Phenomenal
Body and Merleau-Ponty's Critique," pp . 129-133 . (In The Debate between Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty . Edited by Jon Stewart, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1998 . )
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